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Functional decomposition is an important goal in the life sciences, and is central to 
mechanistic explanation and explanatory reduction.  A growing literature in philosophy 
of science, however, has challenged decomposition-based notions of explanation.  
‘Holists’ posit that complex systems exhibit context-sensitivity, dynamic interaction, and 
network dependence, and that these properties undermine decomposition.  They then 
infer from the failure of decomposition to the failure of mechanistic explanation and 
reduction.  I argue that complexity, so construed, is only incompatible with one notion of 
decomposition, which I call ‘atomism’, and not with decomposition writ large.  Atomism 
posits that function ascriptions must be made to parts with minimal reference to the 
surrounding system.  Complexity does indeed falsify atomism, but I contend that there is 
a weaker, ‘contextualist’ notion of decomposition that is fully compatible with the 
properties that holists cite.  Contextualism suggests that the function of parts can shift 
with external context, and that interactions with other parts might help determine their 
context-appropriate functions.  This still admits of functional decomposition within a 
given context.  I will give examples based on the notion of oscillatory multiplexing in 
systems neuroscience.  If contextualism is feasible, then holist inferences are faulty—one 
cannot infer from the presence of complexity to the failure of decomposition, mechanism, 
and reductionism.   
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1  Introduction 
 
Biological systems have parts, which can be distinguished spatially.  When biologists 
functionally decompose a system, they attempt to determine how its distinct parts 
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differentially contribute to its behaviour.  Construed in this way, decomposition is 
fundamental to mechanistic explanation—explanation of the behaviour of a system in 
terms of its parts, the operations they perform, and their organization (Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen [2005]; Bechtel and Richardson [1993]; Machamer, Darden, and Craver, 
2000).  It is also central to post-Nagelian reductionist approaches to explanation.  
‘Explanatory’ or ‘mechanistic’ reductions are those that explain the behaviour of a whole 
in terms of the behaviour of its parts (Bechtel and Hamilton [2007]; Sarkar [1992]; 
Wimsatt [1976]). 
 In this paper I criticize a kind of inference that is often made by opponents of 
mechanistic and reductive explanation, which I call ‘holist inferences’.  Holists infer from 
the properties of context-sensitivity, dynamic interaction, and network dependence in 
complex systems to the failure of functional decomposition, and hence to the failure of 
mechanistic explanation and explanatory reduction.  Often, holist inferences are 
accompanied by the view that we should switch to kinds of explanations which are taken 
to be non-mechanistic, particularly dynamical systems and graph theoretic approaches 
(Chemero and Silberstein [2008]; Silberstein and Chemero [2013]; Rathkopf [2018]).   
 I will argue that holist inferences are invalid, because they take an overly simplified 
form of decomposition as their target.  I call this view of decomposition ‘atomism’.  
Atomism holds that parts of systems should be functionally individuated according to 
what they do intrinsically, rather than what they do in interaction with other parts.  While 
atomism is indeed falsified by complexity, there is a weaker, ‘contextualist’ approach to 
decomposition which is compatible with all of the properties.  If this is the case, then one 
cannot infer from the presence of complexity to the failure of decomposition.  I will 
discuss a case study from systems neuroscience which illustrates how the contextualist 
approach validates decomposition in the presence of complexity. 
 My primary aim is to critique holist inferences, but I also offer contextualism as a 
positive proposal for how mechanists and reductionists can embrace complexity.  Many 
mechanists are not atomists, but the mechanist program as a whole has yet to agree on an 
alternative.  Hence—as I will seek to establish exegetically—holists have continued 
critiquing atomism as a stand-in for the commitments of mechanistic and reductionist 
views.  This has resulted in some disconnect in the literature, with proponents of 
mechanism claiming their views are compatible with complexity, and holists contending 
that they are not.  I propose contextualist decomposition as an alternative core 
commitment for mechanistic and reductionist positions.  Importantly, this clarifies a 
particular kind of explanatory target for these positions, namely understanding 
organizational principles that implement context-specific functional decompositions.  The 
case study is offered as an exemplar of this kind of explanation.  In addition, it shows 
how extant contextualist approaches to neural function (Burnston [2016a], [2016b]; Klein 
[2012]) can help make sense of massively multifunctional brain networks.   
 In section 2, I will lay out atomism in more detail, and give some exegetical evidence 
that it is the position that critics of mechanism and reductionism attack.  In section 3 I 
will exposit two recent, sophisticated versions of holist inferences.  Section 4 outlines the 
contextualist alternative.  Section 5 then gives the case study from systems neuroscience, 
which is built around the notion of ‘multiplexing’ functions via signal modulation, and 
explains in detail how the framework embraces both complexity and decomposition.  In 
section 6 I will discuss the upshot of contextualist decomposition for questions about the 
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scope and limits of mechanistic explanation and the feasibility of reductionism.  Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2  Atomism 
  
What I call ‘holist’ inferences move from the presence of context-sensitivity, interactive 
dynamics, and network-dependence in a system’s functioning to the conclusion that its 
behaviour is not decomposable.  A second inference is often made from here to the 
failure of mechanistic and reductive explanation, and–or to the presence of emergent 
properties. 
 I am only targeting this type of inference in this paper.  I am thus not giving a positive 
argument in favor of mechanism or reduction, and will avoid getting bogged down in 
tricky details about how to define emergent properties (Boogerd et al. [2005]), or how 
‘strong’ a reductionist thesis to embrace (Bickle [2006]; Gillett [2016]; Theurer [2013]).  
I will refer to any position based on these inferences as a ‘holist’ position, where holism 
is meant to contrast with explanations based on functional decomposition.   
 The main claim I will pursue is that there are two notions of decomposition: one that 
is indeed rendered glaringly false by complexity, and a weaker one that in fact 
incorporates complexity wholesale.  The first conception I refer to as ‘atomism’, and is 
based around the notion of intrinsic function.   
 
Intrinsicality (INT):  The function of a part P is to be specified with limited 
reference to the system in which P functions. 
 
The ‘limited’ in the above definition of INT is in reference to the fact that most atomist 
function ascriptions assume a set of normal background conditions (Klein [2018]) and 
causal precursors.  So, one might have an atomistic view of the function of a particular 
gene—for instance, coding for a single trait—but the gene’s exercising this function 
would of course depend on the presence of normal genetic transmission (causal 
precursor) and any transcriptional and epigenetic factors (background conditions) that are 
required for the output of the gene to result in the trait.  Similarly, a muscle fiber might 
function to move a hand, but its doing so requires the appropriate inputs and the actual 
presence of the hand, along with the appropriate downstream wiring.  Atomism requires 
that the background conditions remain in the background.  Changes in the background 
conditions might make the part unable to function, but they should not change what 
function it performs.  If they did, then the (theory of the) part’s operation would not be 
isolatable from the rest of the system in the way that atomism requires. 
 Atomism conjoins intrinsicality with a corollary about direction-of-explanation in 
biological systems, which I call ‘priority’. 
 
Priority (PRI):  The functional properties of the system, S, are to be explained in 
terms of the intrinsic functions of its individual parts.  	  
 
Priority presents both an explanatory and methodological dictum.  Explanations proceed 
from parts to wholes, and go only in this direction.  As such, investigation should begin 
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by first isolating parts and describing their functions, and only then describe how they 
interact to produce phenomena.   
 There are two implications of INT and PRI that I want to stress.  First, they suggest a 
very minimal set of functions, or even a univocal function, for each part.  This is not 
implied by INT on its own.  In principle it is possible that a part could perform multiple 
different functions purely based on its internal operations.1  Multifunctionality is in 
tension with the conjunction of INT and PRI, however.  Even if you could establish that a 
part could perform multiple distinct functions purely by looking at that part, it would 
require reference to properties of the surrounding system to say when and how those 
functions are implemented.  So, INT and PRI together imply that there is a consistent 
function performed by each P.   
 Second, the combination of limited functions and directionality of explanation 
implies a relative lack of flexibility of explanations based on decomposition.  Since each 
of the parts must be studied with limited reference to the system, the baseline resource 
that atomistic explanations start from is a list of the intrinsic functions of the parts.  When 
one goes to explain a given system behaviour, one can at best recombine these functions 
in different ways.  Since the list of intrinsic functions remains constant, there is a limit to 
how much the mechanistic organization of the system should change with context. 
 Atomism can perhaps best be read as a thesis about what mechanistic or reductive 
explanations should aspire to.  On this reading, the best cases of these explanations assign 
a single function to each P, with limited reference to the system, and explanations will be 
less mechanistic–reductive the more reference to the system needs to be made.  This 
‘more-or-less’ conception of decomposition is often evinced in discussions of ‘near 
decomposability’ (Bechtel and Richardon [1993]; Simon [1962]).   
 Why would anyone hold atomism?  First, it provides a methodological dictum that 
has in fact directed different stages of biological research, particularly early stages of 
research directed towards discovering relevant parts and exploring their capacities.  
Second, atomism offers particularly powerful generalizations—if we can find the 
univocal function of a series of parts, then the flexibility of the system consists only in 
how they are recombined, and we have fewer degrees of freedom in theorizing about the 
system.  Regardless of its potential accuracy in describing some stages of research, or its 
theoretical appeal, I will argue that atomism should not be construed as definitive of 
decomposition.  
 The three properties that holists cite as incompatible with decomposition are: 
 
Context sensitivity:  The function of a given P can change depending on events 
external to the part. 
 
Interactive dynamics:  The function of a given P depends on temporally-sensitive 
interactions between distinct quantities in or parts of the system. 
 
Network dependence:  The function of a given P depends on the topological 
structure of the system.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Thanks to Colin Klein and an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to clarify these points. 
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All three properties of complexity are indeed incompatible with atomism.  This is 
because they undermine the idea that one can fix a functional description in any given 
explanation without making reference to the broader system in which a part operates.  
Consider contextual variation first.  Suppose that a given P’s function changes with 
context.  If that is the case, then we must figure out what context we are in when 
describing its function, and how that particular function is implemented in that context.  
A natural way of accounting for this change is that the part is interacting with other parts 
of the system and its environment in a new way, and these external factors can no longer 
be backgrounded or relegated to causal precursors of a univocal function.  Moreover, the 
more continual and dynamic these interactions are, the more tightly coupled the 
behaviour of P will be with other components of the system, and the less isolable it will 
be.  Finally, the more the behaviour of the system depends on global properties, such as 
those described by network theory, the less primary a description of the individual part 
will be in explaining system behaviour.  These properties thus violate INT and PRI.   
 While I can’t fully canvass the relevant literatures here, I believe that atomism is 
standardly taken to be the core notion of decomposition in discussions surrounding 
mechanism and reduction.  I’ll here just present some quotes which suggest this, and then 
discuss some specific examples of holist inferences in more detail in section 3. 
 Consider the following quotes about functional decomposition: 
 
A decomposable system is one in which each subsystem operates 
according to its own intrinsic principles, independently of the others. 
(Pessoa [2008], p. 155) 
 
[A function] is whatever single, relatively simple thing a local neural 
circuit does for or offers to all of the functional complexes of which 
the circuit is a part. (Anderson [2010], p. 295)2 
 
These characterizations cite INT and PRI as definitive of decomposition.  Now consider 
the following quote which is critical of mechanistic explanation.   
 
The guiding image of mechanisms as machinelike structures strongly 
suggests that they are made of discrete parts, each of which carries out 
a dedicated function. […] the less easily the parts can be separated 
from one another while retaining their own functions, the further the 
system drifts away from being mechanistic. […] if several functions 
are assigned to the same structural element, the specialization of 
functional parts that mechanism requires is violated. (Weiskopf 
[2016], p. 677) 
 
This quote moves directly from a purported failure of intrinsicality to the failure of the 
mechanistic approach.  Finally, consider some quotes about explanatory reduction. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Anderson’s view in his 2014 book softens this notion of decomposition, and moves closer to the kind of 
contextualism I advocate.  The relationship between my view and Anderson’s current exposition of 
‘neural reuse’ is too complicated to pursue in detail here. 
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Dynamic interactions can bring about qualitatively new behaviour in 
complex systems. This is precisely where prediction of system 
behaviour on the basis of simpler subsystems fails. We cannot predict 
the behaviour of the components within the entire system and so 
cannot predict systemic behaviour [from component behaviour]. 
(Boogerd et al. [2005], p. 156) 
 
Reductive explanations in the life sciences exhibit three 
characteristics: first, they refer only to factors at a lower level than the 
phenomenon at issue, second, they focus on internal factors and thus 
ignore or simplify the environment of a system, and, third, they cite 
only the parts of a system in isolation. (Kaiser [2011], p. 453) 
 
These quotes suggest that a reductive explanation must consist purely of conjunctions of 
intrinsic function ascriptions, thus reflecting INT and PRI.  Each paper then goes on to 
challenge reductionism on the basis of complexity.  These quotes therefore express 
examples of holist inferences.   
 
3  Holist Inferences in Detail 
 
In a holist inference, one starts from the assumption that, if a system is decomposable, 
then atomism must be true of that system.  One then notes the presence of complexity in 
that system, and argues that it falsifies decomposition.  From the further premise that 
decomposition is the sine qua non of mechanistic and–or reductive explanation, one gets 
to the conclusion that mechanism and reduction must fail for that system.  Since 
dynamical and–or network explanation do not fail for that system, we then get the further 
conclusion that these frameworks, rather than mechanistic ones, do explain the system.  
The atomistic assumption is often left implicit in these discussions, but it is revealed by 
the kinds of properties holists take to license the move away from decomposition.   
 Chemero and Silberstein (Chemero and Silberstein [2008]; Silberstein and Chemero 
[2013]) have recently advanced an influential holist argument, specifically in the 
neuroscience case.  They argue that both mechanist and reductive approaches are firmly 
committed to decomposition, and that decomposition is not possible when properties of 
complexity are present.  For them, complexity arises when system components 
dynamically interact, where some of these interactions are ‘non-local’ and are timing- 
and context-dependent.  In these scenarios, they claim, one cannot isolate functions to 
distinct parts of the system, and thus the system’s parts don’t ‘locally determine the 
capacities or properties’ of the system as a whole.  They state: 
 
In order to get […] reductionism off the ground, there have to be 
context-independent or invariant fundamental parts with intrinsic 
properties such as atoms or cells whose temporal evolution is governed 
by some fundamental context-independent […] laws. (Chemero and 




Systems biology and systems neuroscience contain robust dynamical 
and mathematical explanations of some phenomena in which the 
essential explanatory work is not be being done by localization and 
decomposition. More positively, the explanatory work in these models 
is being done by their graphical/network properties and the dynamics 
thereupon. (Silberstein and Chemero [2013], p. 960) 
 
Hence, as befitting the holist inference schema above, Chemero and Silberstein argue that 
complexity undermines both reductionism and mechanism, and they offer dynamical and 
graph-theoretic description as a fundamentally different kind of explanation.  The 
phenomena they take to be explained by these models—and hence not by 
decomposition—include ‘cognitive capacities’ and ‘connectivity disorders’ such as 
schizophrenia and autism.  
 Rathkopf ([2018]) argues similarly that, in large organizations of interacting 
components, decomposition fails.  He suggests that in these cases ‘global patterns 
variables’ are what explain the behaviour of the system, rather than descriptions of their 
individual components.  The global pattern variables he cites are from graph-theoretic 
descriptions of networks.  They include:  ‘characteristic path length’, which is the 
average distance between any two nodes in a network; ‘clustering coefficient’, which is 
the tendency for two nodes connected to a common node to be themselves connected; and 
‘betweenness centrality’, which is the proportion of shortest paths between any two nodes 
in network that pass through a given node.  Rathkopf argues that these descriptions 
‘collapse’ the patterns of interactions between components into global explanatory 
features.  He shows how ‘small-worldness’ (the combination of a high clustering 
coefficient and a low characteristic path length) has been used to explain the rate-of-
transmission of diseases, and how betweenness centrality has been used to explain traffic 
patterns. 
 Rathkopf claims that in large interactive systems, it is the global pattern of 
organization that is explanatorily relevant, rather than anything about the individual 
nodes or their local interactions.  When complexity is present, the system is ‘not even 
close to being nearly-decomposable’ and scientists are not ‘free to develop a theory of 
each subsystem, and then compose the predictions of those theories in order to yield 
predictions about the behaviour of the whole’ ([2018], p. 69; notice the atomism in the 
framing here).  According to Rathkopf, complexity demands a ‘completely distinct 
explanatory strategy’ from decompositional explanation.  He takes graph-theoretic 
explanation to be such a strategy, compared to decomposition approaches that ‘strip 
away’ complexity. 
 The holism that one ends up with as a result of these holist inferences is one on which 
a description that does not decompose the system, rather than one that does, is 
explanatory of the phenomenon.  A few clarifications are in order.  First, no holist thinks 
that biological systems are not decomposable in any relevant sense.  Holists of course 
admit that biological systems have parts, which are independently describable in some 
ways—one can talk about types of cells, neurotransmitters, spike patterns, and so on.  
Moreover, both Rathkopf and Chemero and Silberstein admit that some explanatory 
scenarios may be susceptible to decomposition.  There may be systems with a small 
number of components or a particularly simple form of interaction for which 
8	  
	  
decompositional approaches work.  There may even be particular systems for which 
some behaviours involve simple interactions and other behaviours exhibit complexity.  
The first would be amenable to decompositional explanation; the second wouldn’t be.  
So, while holists are pluralists to a degree—they posit a ‘complementarity’ (Silberstein 
and Chemero [2013], p. 960) or ‘division-of-labor’ (Rathkopf [2018], p. 75) between 
decompositional and holist explanations—they still see a situational opposition between 
decompositional and holist explanations.  When a system behaviour exhibits complexity 
it requires a holistic, and not a decompositional, explanation.   
 Since I agree with holists that atomism is unsustainable for complex systems, I won’t 
spend time here arguing against atomism as a regulative ideal.  Rather, the question I will 
pursue is whether, given the failure of atomism, holist arguments in fact force the 
abandonment of decomposition.  My goal is to prove that holist arguments are invalid.  
To do this, it needs to be shown that, in the very kinds of scenarios in which holist 
arguments are meant to apply, (i) complexity is indeed present, and (ii) decomposition is 
possible and theoretically fruitful anyway. 
 In what follows I will offer an exemplar case that meets these requirements—
explanation of cognitive capacities via multiplexing of function in the cortex.  Cognitive 
capacities, recall, are one of the explananda that Chemero and Silberstein deny are 
susceptible to decomposition.  And, as we will see, these explanations sometimes invoke 
pattern variables, and thus according to Rathkopf should be non-decomposable.  I will 
argue that contextualist decomposition is still possible in these settings.  If I am right 
about the case, then it shows that, in general, holist inferences are invalid—one cannot 
simply cite complexity in one’s system or phenomenon of interest as a way of denying 
mechanistic or reductive explanations for that explanandum.  This falls short of showing 
that all systems are decomposable, or that all explanations are mechanistic.3  Again, I am 
simply targeting holist inferences here, and offering contextualism as a potential strategy 
for mechanists and reductionists to pursue in other systems of interest.   
 
4  Contextualism as An Alternative 
 
I call the alternative, non-atomistic form of decomposition ‘contextualist’, because it 
starts out from the notion that the function a given part might change depending on the 
context in which it operates.  As discussed above, contextual variation is a wedge that, 
once opened, immediately draws in the other properties.  If the function of a part shifts 
with context, then a natural explanation for those shifts is that it is dynamically 
interacting with other parts of the system and the environment.  Thus, contextualism 
abandons INT and PRI, which are definitive of atomism.  Concomitantly, contextualism 
doesn’t imply that we need a list of intrinsic functions that explains S’s behaviour in any 
context.  Quite the contrary:  contextualism only suggests that we should be able to find 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  For instance, there are added complications in thinking about system properties such as robustness 
(Huneman [2010]; Jones, [2014]), about general ‘design principles’ (Brigandt, Green, and O’Malley 
[2018]; van Eck and Mennes [2018]), or about optimality tradeoffs (Rice [2015]).  Since these 
frameworks are interested in system properties in general, they often intentionally abstract away from 
details about particular systems.  There are also complicated considerations surrounding the explanatory 
relationship between mechanisms and models in cognitive psychology (Piccinini and Craver [2011]; 
Stinson [2016]; Weiskopf [2016]).  Regardless of the overall merits of these discussions, I will argue that 
cognitive functioning in the cortex is not best explained in a holist way. 
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differences between what the distinct parts of S are doing within a given context.  
Contextualism is thus fully compatible with multifunctionality, and is considerably more 
flexible than atomism in how it describes systems.  It says that analysis starts from a 
context—we don’t have to expect that the functional divisions made in one context will 
be the same as those made in another.   
 Contextualism is a significant departure from the recent history of function ascription 
in neuroscience, which has decidedly atomist leanings.4  Atomism attempts to describe 
each part of the brain as performing a univocal function, distinct from what other parts 
do.  Consider the standard picture of the visual cortex.  On an atomist view, visual cortex 
has the function of processing visual information.  Each area in the visual cortex plays a 
particular role in this process, representing particular types of visual information at 
particular degrees of abstraction.   
 Giving a particular atomist description of a brain area’s function involves settling on 
a particular spatial localization and applying a univocal functional description at the 
appropriate level of generalization.  Area V1 is standardly subdivided into distinct 
populations representing orientation, wavelength, and displacement.  Area MT is 
generally construed as a single unit, with the function of representing pattern motion on 
the basis of information about local displacement from V1.  This function is distinct from 
areas further along the dorsal stream, which represent more complex motion patterns.  V4 
is standardly subdivided into two sections, one with the univocal function of representing 
natural colours, and the other for representing visual form (Van Essen and DeYoe 
[1988]).   
 Each atomist functional description is a generalization that is meant to capture a 
part’s function as a whole, in a way that distinguishes it from other areas.  A 
generalization pitched at too low a level would not accurately characterize the function.  
Arguing that MT processes direction of motion would not account for the fact that it is 
sensitive to speed as well, while the pattern motion description does. Alternatively, a 
generalization pitched at too high a level would not distinguish MT from other areas—its 
function is more specific, say, than ‘processing visual information’, a description it shares 
with many other brain areas (Burnston [2016a]; Rathkopf [2013].  Giving these kinds of 
descriptions also involves determining causal precursors.  For instance, MT requires 
information about displacement to be input from V1 before it can compute pattern 
motion.   
 The data that leads one away from atomist and towards contextualist views is data 
that speaks towards multifunctionality.  If a brain area genuinely has multiple functions, 
and which function it plays varies with perceptual or behavioural context, then a 
contextualist rather than atomist description is appropriate for that area.  Importantly, 
contextualist generalizations must operate at the same spatial and descriptive level as the 
atomist ones they are meant to replace.   
 Consider MT again.  The last twenty years of investigation into MT have revealed 
that MT cells have detailed responses to several varieties of depth, as signaled by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 As Mundale ([2002]) notes, there is also a long history of holist positions in neuroscience, ranging from 
equipotentiality across the whole brain to the possibility of some regional variation.  There are also 
middle ground holist positions but, as Mundale states:  ‘Generally […] holism does not accord well with 
functional localization’ (p. 316).  I will not delve into the history or the details here.  See Mundale’s 
paper for discussion. 
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binocular disparity, and these responses are psychophysically important.  MT responses 
to coarse depth (distance from the perceiver) are predictive of animals’ depth judgements, 
similarly to how MT’s motion responses are predictive of motion judgments, and these 
effects can be manipulated by microstimulation (Uka and DeAngelis [2006]).  Moreover, 
MT cells’ depth and motion responses are statistically independent, meaning that MT can 
represent depth even in the absence of motion, or vice versa (for instance, a moving 
stimulus at the ‘fixation plane’, where no binocular disparity information is present; 
Palanca and DeAngelis [2003]).  Moreover, and importantly, the vast majority of MT 
cells (94%) have both motion and depth-selectivity, and depth selectivity properties are 
organized into representational maps (in which cells with similar selectivity properties 
are close to each other) which cross-cut the organization of motion representation 
(DeAngelis, Cumming, and Newsome [1998]).  In addition to coarse depth, MT cells also 
exhibit selectivity to fine depth features of tilt and slant, as cued by combinations of 
disparity and velocity cues.  
 These properties suggest that MT is genuinely multifunctional—its constituent cells 
have response properties to different types of information, and these lead to different 
generalizations about what the area is representing in different contexts.  The genuine 
multiplicity of the functions speaks against a couple of responses atomists might make.  
First, it speaks against simply re-describing the univocal generalization to account for the 
new data.  Whereas there is a natural generalization that groups leftward and rightward 
pattern motion under ‘pattern motion’, there are limited candidates to describe the 
combined motion, coarse depth, and fine-depth descriptions under a single generalization 
that would still distinguish MT from other visual areas (see Burnston [2016a] for more 
thorough discussion).   Moreover, since it is the entire area that exhibits these properties, 
one cannot apply what McCaffrey ([2015]) has called a ‘subdivide-and-conquer’ strategy, 
such as the one standardly used in V4, which breaks up a single area into multiple 
function-specific areas.  Theorists have recently gotten quite liberal with subdivide-and-
conquer strategies, even suggesting that functions can be spatially isolated to distinct but 
interdigitated populations (which Kanwisher [2010], calls ‘archipelagos’), but if it is the 
very same population which is multifunctional, this strategy is off the table.5     
 A number of theorists have recently argued that contextualism and functional 
localization are not incompatible (Bechtel [2012]; Burnston [2016a], [2016b]; Khalidi 
[2017]; Klein [2012]; McIntosh [2004]; see Brigandt [2017] for contextualism applied to 
individuation of function more broadly).  Different discussions of contextualism focus on 
different aspects of context and on different philosophical issues arising from the view.  
My purpose here is to apply contextualism to broader debates about decomposition rather 
than defend a particular version of it, so I will only give rough outline of the view, 
drawing heavily on the formulation I’ve developed elsewhere (Burnston [2016a], 
[2016b]).  Contextualism is an attempt to isolate functions to parts of the brain within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 As an anonymous reviewer helpfully points out, one might attempt a kind of generalization on which 
individual cells or groups of cells could be context-sensitive, even while the area they constitute is uni-
functional.  There is some evidence that individual MT cells, for instance, can switch from representing 
component (local movement) to pattern motion depending on features of the stimulus, and one could try to 
interpret this as contextual variation at the lower-level and univocality at the higher (see Burnston [2016a], 
for detailed discussion of this case; for further discussion of complexities in MT cells’ representation of 
motion, see Madary [2013]).  This will not work for the depth case, however, since the entire area 
comprises distinct representational functions.   
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contexts.  It argues that the brain is functionally decomposable so long as (i) within a 
given context, we can specify what function a part of the brain is performing, and (ii) 
different areas differ in their functional ‘profiles’—the way their functions vary as 
contexts change (Anderson [2014]; Scarantino [2012]).  MT and V4 for instance, both 
represent a range of features in different contexts, but these features and contexts differ.   
 Contextualism faces epistemic challenges, particularly in how it produces useful 
generalizations and how it guides research.6  Contextualist function ascriptions are 
importantly ‘open’—they admit continual amendment to function ascriptions as novel 
contexts are explored.  The key to producing useful generalizations is to seek to 
demarcate the changes of context that produce a change in what a brain area does, versus 
the changes that do not.  For instance, MT represents depth in both stationary and moving 
stimuli.  Its depth-representing function is thus invariant across changes along the motion 
dimension, and so long as we are within any of these contexts, we can projectably say 
that MT will represent that information (Klein [2012]).  On the other hand, extant 
function ascriptions—whether starting from an atomist ascription or a contextually 
indexed one—guide research by providing defeasible pragmatic assumptions about what 
a brain area will do in an unexplored context.  These assumptions invoke researchers to 
attempt to show changes in an area’s behaviour in a novel context that cannot be 
accounted for under extant function ascriptions, before expanding their understanding of 
the area to include a new, contextually-indexed function. 
 I have only focused on one particular brain area here, but as noted above, atomistic 
function ascriptions are very standard in neuroscience.  The decomposition of the visual 
system into feature-specific areas is often seen as an exemplar for other sensory systems.  
It is also common, for instance, to divide the language system into production (Broca’s 
area) and comprehension (Wernicke’s) systems.  Motor systems are standardly seen to 
operate on a representational hierarchy similar to the visual system (Grafton and 
Hamilton [2007]).  More controversial recent proposals include the idea that there is a 
lateral–medial distinction in the prefrontal cortex for deliberative versus emotional 
decision-making (Cushman, Young, and Greene [2010]).  But, as with MT, there is 
widespread evidence of multifunctionality in other areas of the brain, and this evidence 
exists from different measurement techniques and at different spatial scales.  According 
to a meta-review of fMRI data by Anderson ([2010]), the average cortical area is 
implicated in no less than nine distinct types of task.7  Electrophysiological advances 
have shown that cells across the frontal cortex and in perceptual areas, as well as in 
subcortical areas, are ‘hyperdimensional’—they encode for a range of stimulus, response, 
and context parameters, depending in the task (Fusi et al. [2016]; Panzeri et al. [2015]).  
Again here, the data suggests multifunctionality both at the level of whole brain areas and 
at the level of individual cells, speaking against subdivide-and-conquer strategies.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Of course, contextualism must also establish that it is the correct way to read the data.  One alternative is 
to claim that evidence in favor of multifunctionality is only apparent, and that each brain area can be 
characterized as performing a variety of abstract signal transform (see, for example, Anderson [2010]; 
Bergeron [2007]; Rathkopf [2013]).  Burnston ([2016a]) argues in detail that these views cannot capture 
the contextual variation in brain systems in a way compatible with atomism, and thus that there are non-
eliminable contextual elements in the functioning of brain areas. 
7  How these results turn out depends on how one parses cognitive domains across studies, and thus on 
adopting a cognitive ontology.  Even across multiple ways of construing cognitive domains, however, 
brain areas tend to exhibit functional diversity in meta-analyses (see Anderson [2014] for review). 
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 In addition to being generally multifunctional, brain areas also exhibit high degrees of 
interactivity, and it has become clear that interactions between different parts of the brain 
are vital for fulfilling cognitive functions.  I will give several examples below.  These 
kinds of interactions are particularly important for the discussion of holist inferences.  
Contextualists argue, contra atomism, that contextual variation and multifunctionality are 
compatible with decomposition.  The question then, naturally turns to how those different 
functions are implemented.  What are the organizational features of the brain that 
implement contextually varying functions, and do these require resorting to a holist kind 
of view?  Moreover, understanding these interactions is important for understanding how 
the brain itself is organized.  If brain areas are multifunctional, then one of the major 
problems that the brain has to solve is how to solicit the right functions in the right 
contexts.  There thus need to be principles of control that implement the correct 
functional organization in the appropriate settings.  In the next section I will explore a 
framework that has recently been developed in systems neuroscience, which has begun to 
address these problems.  I will then argue that this proposal, while abandoning atomism, 
is compatible with contextualist decomposition.   
  
5  Multiplexing and Contextualist Decomposition 
 
The proposal I will pursue is that neural activity is ‘multiplexed’.  That is, physiological 
activity within a given brain unit—cell, population of cells, or brain area—is not 
dependent solely on its inputs, but is modulated by background variables.  I will show 
examples where different patterns of modulation produce different kinds of functional 
contributions within the very same group of cells or brain area.  This in turn shows how 
context-sensitive functions can be implemented. 
 Multiplexing is implemented by the relationship between action potentials of 
individual cells and the background ‘local field potential’ (LFP).  The LFP is basically a 
summation of electrical activity in a particular part of the brain.  It involves not only 
neurons firing action potentials, but also post-spike polarizations, subthreshold activity, 
and post-synaptic activation (Khanna and Carmena [2015]; Panzeri et al. [2010]).  LFPs 
can be measured using implanted electrodes, as well as extra-cranially through EEG.  
While the basic units of LFP production are networks of roughly 10,000 neurons 
(Canolty and Knight [2010]), EEG results show that there are coherent patterns of LFP 
activity at the level of entire brain areas and, as we will see later, of brain networks.  
LFPs within neural populations are oscillatory.  They exhibit electrical activity at 
characteristic frequencies, which are described in terms of frequency bands—delta (1–4 
hz), theta (4–8 hz), alpha (8–12 hz), beta (12–30 hz) and gamma (30 hz and above).8  A 
given brain area can also exhibit multiple distinct frequencies within its LFP at a given 
time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  Where one draws the lines between frequency bands is somewhat arbitrary (these designations are from 
Canolty et al., [2010]).  This arbitrariness makes no difference for the sort of coding principles I will 
discuss—what matters is that different frequencies are available for different functions via multiplexing.  
The dependence of function on LFP oscillation has been cited in Bechtel ([2012]) and Viola and Zanin 
([2017]), but has not received thorough philosophical exposition.  Haueis ([2018]) considers the 
possibility that oscillations in the cortex, particularly in the gamma band, have ‘infrastructural’ rather 
than cognitive functions, but as he admits, a general contextualism is compatible with oscillations 
playing both infrastructural and cognitive roles. 
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 Consider the abstract example of multiplexing given by Watrous et al. ([2015]) in 




Figure 1.  From Watrous et al. ([2015]).  Reproduced with permission. 
 
Suppose that a single cell or group of cells exhibits the responses to ‘light’ and ‘dark’ 
stimuli shown in the bottom part of (a).  The firing rate alone will not distinguish between 
light and dark.  However, modulation by properties of the background LFP, including 
frequency, phase, and–or amplitude can tease apart the signals.  Modulation occurs when 
spiking behavior is indexed to certain properties of the LFP.  Different combinations of 
such schemes are shown in the other panels, with the modulation schemes shown on the 
left and the signal differentiation in the heat maps to the right. 
 In panel (b) the signals are modulated by frequency.  The dark signal is only affected 
by a low-frequency waveform, and the light one only by a higher frequency.  The signals 
are not significantly modulated by phase, as is shown in the spread across the phase 
dimension of the heat map.  Panel (c) shows phase modulation.  Both firing patterns are 
modulated by two distinct frequencies, but at distinct phases of each—dark at the peak 
and light at the trough.  Hence, frequency modulation does not differentiate them, but 
phase modulation does, as the heat map indicates.  Panel (d) shows a combination of 
frequency and phase modulation, with dark signals grouped at the peak of the low-
frequency waveform, while light signals are grouped at the trough of the higher 
frequency one.  This further differentiates the signals, again as the heat map indicates.  
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Further, the schemes in (b) and (d) are also amplitude-specific, with modulation 
occurring only at a specific amplitude in each frequency.   
 The basic principle is abstractly similar to frequency modulation in wireless 
communication, where a content-signal is indexed to a background carrier frequency.  
Employing a metaphor from communication technology, Akam and Kullmann ([2014]) 
say that the background frequency is ‘meta-data’, which distinguishes different signals 
even if they spatially overlap, and allows for those signals to be selectively responded to 
for particular purposes.   
 Multiplexing aligns with contextualist function ascriptions when the background 
modulation changes what type of function a population or brain area is contributing to.9  
This can be done, for instance, by changing what kind of information is being processed, 
as in the case discussed above, or by changing what functional network a brain area is 
part of, as we will discuss below.  If multiplexing contributes to specifying what function 
a brain area is performing within a context, then there must be ways of setting up the 
appropriate multiplexing scheme for that context, and for the rest of the brain to respond 
appropriately.  Two principles that help implement the needed interactions on the 
multiplexing framework are ‘phase synchrony’ and ‘cross frequency coupling’.  Phase 
synchrony occurs when the LFPs in two distinct brain areas become synchronized.  
Cross-frequency coupling occurs within a brain area when multiple distinct phase 
components become coupled, usually with a lower-frequency component modulating a 
higher-frequency one.  This can in turn affect cell firing.  A common coding scheme is 
for lower-frequency activity, such as in the theta or beta band, to modulate gamma 
activity, which is shown to closely mirror spiking behaviour in populations of individual 
neurons (Lisman and Jensen [2013]).   
 This framework allows for a multi-scale account of how multiplexing contributes to 
functional modulation.  If, for instance, A and B exhibit phase synchrony in their low-
frequency LFPs, and at B the low frequency couples with high frequency LFP 
components, this in turn provides a way for A to modulate the behaviour of cells in B.  
That is, the low-frequency interaction between A and B might provide the meta-data that 
modulates high frequency spiking behaviour at B.   This, in the abstract, is the framework 
I’ll be analyzing for the remainder of the paper. 
 I have already argued above that context-sensitivity is not in principle incompatible 
with decomposition, due to the presence of a viable contextualist alternative.  The 
question then turns to whether the other properties—dynamics and network dependence, 
in fact force a holist interpretation.  I will now look at three cases:  dynamic variability 
within a brain area (5.1), dynamic interaction between brain areas (5.2), and dependence 
on network structure (5.3), and argue that dynamics and network-dependence, far from 
being incompatible with decomposition, in fact show how context-sensitive functional 
decompositions are implemented in complex brain networks. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The term ‘multiplexing’ is occasionally employed in different ways in neuroscience, some of which are 
weaker than what I mean here.  The term occasionally refers to distinct properties of a firing pattern (for 
instance, spike timing versus frequency) carrying different information (Harvey et al. [2013]).  Akam and 
Kullmann’s ([2014]) discuss multiplexing as primarily a means for signal routing.  Neither of these uses 
imply a change in what is represented by the brain area across contexts.  I will thus use the term to refer 
exclusively to the stronger, function-shifting role for multiplexing posited by Watrous et al.  Thanks to 
Bryce Gessell for pushing me to clarify this point. 
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5.1  Internal dynamics 
 
In a brilliant study, Canolty et al. ([2012]) measured activity from a group of cells as they 
contributed to multiple distinct tasks, in relation to the background LFP.  They focused 
on motor cortex (M1) in monkeys.  M1 is known independently to contribute to 
sophisticated behavioural movements of the limbs (Graziano [2006]).  So, the first task 
the monkeys had to perform was to reach towards a target.  The other task was a brain-
computer interface task.  In this kind of setup, an electrode is implanted into the brain, 
and the subject learns to control a computer cursor by intentionally manipulating the 
patterns of electricity on the electrode.  Canolty et al. inserted the electrode over M1 cells 
involved in the reach task, so that the very same cells would contribute to both tasks.  The 
question was how the same set of M1 cells might flexibly shift their contributions 
between the two contexts.   
 Canolty et al. measured how spiking in individual M1 cells varied in relation to the 
background beta LFP across tasks.  What they found was striking: even at the single cell 
level, firing patterns were modulated distinctly but reliably by the background LFP in the 
distinct tasks.  Individual cells had particular patterns of modulation which depended on 
both the phase and the amplitude of the beta LFP.  (The amplitude of the beta LFP varied 
during the course of the task, allowing the relative modulation of cells at different beta 
amplitudes to be measured.)  But these patterns were different in the two distinct tasks—a 
given cell would exhibit a certain pattern of modulation by beta in the cursor task, then a 
distinct pattern in the reach task.  So, even if the cells are active during both tasks, they 
can contribute to distinct behaviours depending on the task context.  This is especially 
true at the population level.  While different cells had different precise modulation 
patterns, the whole population would produce extremely different patterns in the two 
tasks, and these patterns were repeatable across different instances of the same type of 
task.   
 As Canolty et al. note, the combination of flexible but reliably-invoked modulation 
schemes is just the kind of property that a multifunctional system needs to exhibit to 
produce the right functions in the right contexts.  It is important to stress that these 
modulations are dynamical processes within the system—the change in function is due to 
the interaction of multiple temporally defined properties (firing and LFP), each of which 
vary over time, and which change their pattern of interactions as task context varies.  So, 
if dynamic modulation of function were really incompatible with decomposition, then 
this kind of result would be evidence against decomposition. 
 The results, however, are in no way incompatible with contextualist decomposition.  
Contextualism does not imply, as atomism does, that we could not map distinct functions, 
in distinct contexts, to the very same part.  In each task context here, it is difficult to 
debate that the function of moving the arm or moving the cursor is being implemented by 
M1 cells.  And the multiplexing framework provides explanatory principles for how 
those distinct functions can be implemented in distinct contexts.  What we have here is a 
story about how M1 cells serve two distinct functions in distinct contexts, not one on 
which there are no specific function attributions that can be made to M1.   
 Now, this is not the whole story, since something must implement the change in 
modulation in M1 with changes in the task.  The holist might suggest that the dependence 
of modulation on factors external to the population of cells means that the behaviour of 
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the population is sensitive to the functioning of the whole system.  We thus now turn to 
dynamic interaction and network dependence. 
 
5.2  Dynamic interaction 
 
At the outset, it is worth noting that the multiplexing framework opens up an extreme 
amount of flexibility in terms of the kinds of modulations that can be employed.  There 
are at least three factors that contribute to this flexibility.  Functions can vary by:  (i) the 
particular pattern of modulation at a given frequency; (ii) the particular frequencies that 
make up the coding scheme; and (iii) the particular brain areas involved.  We just saw an 
example of the first type, on which different patterns of cell firing modulation by beta 
contribute to distinct functions.  Beta, however, plays different roles in different 
networks—it also is involved in sensorimotor decision making, for instance, as we will 
see below.  Alpha and theta similarly make diverse contributions depending on the 
functional network in which they are acting (Voytek et al. [2010]; Lisman and Jensen 
[2013]).  And functional networks for given tasks can be differentiated according to 
which brain areas they comprise (see Stanley et al. [2019], for helpful discussion).  The 
examples discussed in this and the next section exhibit these principles of functional 
variability.   
 The posterior parietal (PPC) and prefrontal (PFC) cortices are important for a variety 
of functions—they are sometimes known as the ‘frontoparietal control network’ 
(Westphal et al. [2017]).  In a simple sensorimotor task, for instance, a subject must map 
a sensory input, such as correlated movement in a dot-motion stimulus, to a particular 
motor response, such as a button press.  Siegel et al. ([2011]) used EEG to measure 
patterns in LFP activity in humans when they made decisions about motion direction at 
close-to-threshold levels of discriminability.  They showed that during the initial stimulus 
and the actual movement, gamma synchrony increases and beta synchrony decreases in 
extrastriate cortex and in motor cortex, respectively.  In the interval between the 
presentation of the stimulus and the required motor response, beta synchrony increases in 
the frontoparietal control network.  Vitally, the strength of frontoparietal beta phase 
synchrony predicts whether the subject is correct in the task, but does not predict the 
particular decision that is made (Siegel et al. [2011]).   
 Siegel et al.’s interpretation of the results is that the beta phase synchrony in 
frontoparietal regions links up sensory information and motor commands in the relevant 
regions (which exhibit beta synchrony during the delay, but at a lesser degree than 
frontoparietal regions), and maintains the sensory evidence necessary for the decision 
during the delay period.  The description here, as the authors themselves stress, is of a 
dynamic pattern of activity across these brain areas, which is underlain by both feed-
forward and feedback connections between the areas (Siegel et al. [2012]).  But the 
results still support a functional decomposition of the network in the decision task.  The 
gamma frequency activation at the two regions during stimulus onset and motor response 
support the view that MT underlies the motion perception, and premotor cortex the 
movement preparation.  The frontoparietal network exhibits particular frequency- and 
time-specific engagement in this process, which leads to the hypothesis about its 
evidence-maintaining role—a different role than is posted for MT or motor cortex.   
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 It is also important to note that, as task demands change, more areas can interact with 
this system, but it ways that are still functionally decomposable.  If the task explicitly 
requires spatial attention, further phase synchrony is implemented in the gamma band 
between an overlapping, but non-identical network including the frontal eye fields, the 
PPC, and visual cortical areas (Siegel et al. [2012]).  While the PPC is involved in both 
aspects of the task, distinct frequencies modulate these distinct contributions, and 
different overall interactants take part, as per the flexibility discussed above.  And as 
discussed in the last section, these changes can be produced reliably as task demands 
change.  So, even dynamic interaction between areas, and dynamic changes in what brain 
areas are included in a network, are compatible with decomposition on the multiplexing–
contextualist picture.  
 
5.3  Network dependence 
 
The frontoparietal network is also important for episodic memory, now in conjunction 
with the medial temporal lobe (MTL), which includes the hippocampus, as well as the 
entorhinal cortex and parahippocampal gyrus (Watrous and Ekstrom [2014]).  Episodic 
memory, however, involves different coordinating LFP frequencies from sensorimotor 
decision making, and intriguingly these frequencies can be used to dissociate between 
distinct memory tasks.  Ekstrom et al. ([2013]) trained human subjects in a virtual reality 
environment—their task was to drive a virtual ‘friend’ around from store to store in a 
virtual neighborhood, picking them up and dropping them off.  After experience with the 
environment, subjects were then asked one of two distinct types of question about 
relationships between stores:  which ones were closer to each other (spatial question), or 
which ones were visited in which order (temporal question).  In two separate studies, one 
with intracranial EEG and one with fMRI, Watrous and colleagues measured phase 
synchrony and ‘functional connectivity’—the coactivation of areas in particular 
conditions.   
 Phase synchrony was shown between the MTL, PPC, and PFC in both spatial and 
temporal recall, but at different frequencies—delta (1–4 hz) for spatial memory, and high 
theta (7–10 hz) for temporal.  So, even for very closely related tasks involving similar 
brain areas, the frequency of background LFP phase synchrony can discriminate between 
behavioural conditions.  This supports the kind of analysis of dynamical modulation 
given in the last section.  However, these were not the only areas to show phase 
synchrony in these conditions, and it is well-established that successful episodic memory 
recall involves greater interconnection across a wide brain network compared to non-
successful recall (Westphal et al., [2017]).  To explore this connectivity further, Watrous 
and colleagues analyzed the data in terms of network measurements.  In particular, they 
looked at the degree of each area, which is the number of other areas with which each 
area was synchronized or co-active, and at betweenness centrality, which measures the 
number of shortest paths between other areas that connect through the area of interest.   
 Recall Rathkopf’s variety of holist inference from section 3.  Rathkopf thinks that one 
is forced into the non-mechanistic (non-decompositional) side of the explanatory 
division-of-labor by complexity, and that the explanatory relevance of pattern variables is 
evidence that that divide has been crossed.  Degree-distribution across the network and 
betweenness centrality are precisely the kind of global pattern variables Rathkopf is 
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interested in, and thus his argument predicts that decomposition should be unfruitful in 
these contexts.  This does not, however, match the way that the research proceeded, or 
the kinds of explanatory hypotheses the researchers offer. 
 Watrous and colleagues’ functional connectivity measurements showed that both 
synchrony and connectivity, measured by the overall degree measurement in the network, 
were increased during correct as compared to incorrect trials, as were both node degree 
and betweenness centrality in the ‘hub’ regions of PFC, PPC, and MTL.  The MTL had 
similar degree and betweenness measures in each type of task, and these were the highest 
measures in the network.  Intriguingly, however, there were also differences between the 
tasks.  Prefrontal areas showed greater values for network measures in the temporal 
context, and parietal in the spatial context.  Moreover, while there was significant overlap 
between the networks, it was not complete.  Both tasks activated a wide frontal network 
in the superior and medial frontal gyri, but different parietal areas—the precuneus versus 
the inferior parietal lobule—were involved in the network in spatial versus temporal 
tasks, respectively.  This matches prior MRI results implicating these sub-areas of the 
PPC in these types of task (Watrous et al. [2013]). 
 While Rathkopf is right that the pattern variables are playing an important 
explanatory role here, the case is not one in which decomposition fails.  Two distinct 
frequencies of cross-frequency coupling are involved in the two distinct tasks, and while 
there is overlap in the networks, that overlap is not complete.  Moreover, and importantly, 
the researchers take the MTL’s centrality for each task to indicate that it plays a distinct 
functional role from other areas.  Watrous and Ekstrom ([2014]) propose that the MTL is 
in charge of coordinating a widespread low-frequency oscillation that is appropriate in 
the context, and that cross-frequency coupling in cortical areas implements item-specific 
reactivation.   
 To summarize:  Rathkopf’s version of holist inference posits a distinction between 
system behaviours that are explained by pattern variables and those that are 
decomposable.  The studies reviewed here employ the kinds of variables that Rathkopf 
cites to help understand the distinction between types of episodic memory.  However, 
these measurements, which establish the centrality of the MTL in both contexts, and the 
respective centrality of the prefrontal and parietal for specific tasks, inspire an attempt at 
functional decomposition rather than a denial of it.  And it is worth noting that this 
extends to other settings where centrality is important.  Siegel et al. ([2012]), in 
summarizing the studies from the last section, suggest that the PPC is a central hub in 
both attentional and decision networks, although again at distinct frequencies.  But as 
discussed above, these networks are not non-decomposable.   
 I thus conclude that the contextualist approach is compatible with all three properties 
of complexity that motivate holist inferences.  If this is true, then those inferences are 
invalid.  I now proceed to analyze how this result intersects with extant debates in the 
literature.   
 
6  Philosophical Upshot 
 




As I noted in the introduction, many mechanists and reductionists are not atomists.  
Mechanists have argued that mechanism identity is explanandum relative (Craver 
[2007]), that mechanism description should be sensitive to explanatory context (Craver 
[2001]), and for a variety of ways in which dynamical and network-based models of 
systems can interact productively with mechanistic research.  Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
([2009], [2010]; Bechtel, [2016]) in particular have argued that understanding dynamics, 
‘recomposing’ the mechanism, and situating the mechanism in the environment (Roe and 
Baumgartner [2017]) are all important for understanding how a mechanism produces a 
phenomenon.10  In discussion of reductionism, Wimsatt ([2006]) has suggested that inter-
level correspondences within mechanisms will be heavily context-dependent.   Bechtel 
and Abrahamsen ([2008]) suggest that, even within a reductionist framework, one must 
occasionally resort to higher-level descriptions to understand the organization one hopes 
to reduce.  Bechtel and Levy ([2016]; Bechtel [2017]) have recently sought a substantive 
notion of mechanism that avoids implications about rigid organization.  According to 
their ‘mechanism 2.0’, distinct mechanisms may overlap, mechanisms may gain or lose 
parts over time, and mechanisms may exist only transiently. 
 Why, then, has failure of atomism been taken by holists to equate to failure of 
mechanism?  I suggest that the likely reason is the continuing influence of the more-or-
less notion of decomposability inspired by taking atomism as a regulative ideal (see 
section 2).  If mechanists and reductionists are committed to atomism being ‘close-
enough’ to accurate, then widespread complexity really should undermine mechanism 
and reductionism, and loosening these views to accommodate complexity weakens them 
to such an extent that they lack distinctive content.   
 Nowhere is this kind of sentiment more clear than in current debates over the ‘scope 
and limits’ of mechanistic explanation (Halina [2017]).  Some, particularly Weiskopf 
([2016]) and Moss [(2012)], argue that mechanistic theorizing is deeply beholden to the 
‘machine-analogy’, on which neatly separable parts engage in simple interactions like 
those in everyday machines.  Along these lines, Silberstein and Chemero ([2013]) suggest 
that one can save mechanism in complex systems only by abandoning the idea that 
decomposition is the key commitment of a mechanistic approach.  Rathkopf ([2018)] 
argues that the mechanistic commitment to decomposition is what underlies the division-
of-labor he proposes.  Giving up or weakening decomposition would, it seems, bring 
together mechanistic and network explanations in an unprincipled manner, by fiat.  
 Some mechanists respond to these kinds of concerns by eschewing the machine 
analogy (Craver [2007]; Bechtel and Abrahamsen [2012]).  Others, however, seem to 
have been at least tempted by the move to abandon the need for decomposition as a 
distinctively mechanistic commitment (Stinson [2016]; Zednik [2014]).  I agree with the 
critics of mechanism that decomposition should be seen as the core commitment of 
mechanistic and reductionist approaches, and thus that abandoning this commitment 
would deflate the view.  But I of course disagree that this distinctive commitment must be 
read in atomist terms.  What mechanists and reductionists need is a well-fleshed-out 
alternative to atomism that retains decomposition as a central commitment while also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The literature on the relationship between dynamical, network, and mechanistic explanations is waxing 
voluminous, and I can’t do full justice to it here.  On dynamics, see (Kaplan and Craver [2011]; Levy 
[2013]; Ross [2015]).  On networks, see (Bechtel [2015], [2017]; Levy and Bechtel [2013]; Craver [2016]; 
Green et al. [2017]; Matthiessen [2017]). 
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explicitly embracing complexity.  I have offered contextualism as a general alternative 
principle, and the multiplexing framework as an exemplar.  The multiplexing framework 
shows how neuroscientists have sought principles that decompose functions even in cases 
where dynamic interaction and network-mediation are abundantly in evidence.  I have 
argued that contextualism captures the kinds of decompositions at work in these 
explanations.   
 But there is more here for mechanists—in particular, the multiplexing field is now 
pursuing the kind of multilevel decompositions and interventions that many take to be the 
hallmark of mechanistic explanatory schemata.  While the studies I’ve cited are generally 
correlational, neuroscientists have begun to (i) pursue lower-level explanations of how 
LFPs, cross-frequency coupling, and phase synchrony are enacted, and (ii) intervene at 
multiple levels to show causal relevance of multiplexing for phenomena of interest.   It 
has been shown that different LFP waveforms exhibit differences both in the interlayer 
patterns of connectivity between cortical cells, as well as different neuromodulatory 
patterns (Womelsdorf et al. [2014]).  Hypotheses have also been stated to address the 
links by which phase coupling between areas occurs.   Geib et al. ([2015]), for instance, 
propose that the caudate nucleus provides a mediating connection between MTL and 
frontal areas that underlies functional connectivity, and the thalamus seems to be 
important for connecting up cortical areas more broadly (Hwang et al. [2017]).   
 Lastly, it is possible to intervene on LFPs in several ways to test their causal 
contribution to phenomena (Woodward [2010]).  Spellman et al. ([2015]) showed that 
optogenetic interruption of hippocampal-prefrontal phase synchrony inhibits memory 
encoding in rats.  Polania et al. ([2015]), applied transcranial alternating current 
stimulation to impose antiphase oscillations between the medial frontal and parietal 
cortices, which interrupted value-based choices in human participants.  The multiplexing 
framework thus supports the kinds of multilevel, interventionist investigation typical of 
mechanistic research, in addition to successfully decomposing function, albeit in a non-
atomist way. 
 
6.2  The context objection to reduction 
 
The ‘context objection’ to reductionism states that context-sensitivity of function within a 
mechanism is incompatible with reductionism.  Delehanty ([2005]) has given an elegant 
response to this objection, based on the idea that we can expand the mechanism being 
analysed to include whatever contextual influences are relevant to explaining the 
system’s behaviour.  I here argue that contextualism has more resources than Delehanty 
takes advantage of, and thus that contextualism can avoid further objections by Hütteman 
and Love ([2011]).   
 Suppose we have an explanandum E and a purported mechanism M responsible for it.   
However, in the course of investigation we find that M is systematically affected by some 
part of the system outside of it in E contexts, and that without this influence we cannot 
explain why it produces E.  Delehanty’s solution is that we expand the mechanism for E 
to include M+n, where n is the set of interactions that, in addition to M, are cited in the 
explanation.  So long as the explanation invoking M+n still consists in a description of 
distinct parts and their interactions, the explanation is still reductive.  As Hütteman and 
Love helpfully summarize: the idea is simply to reduce the context as well. 
21	  
	  
 Hütteman and Love give two considerations against the contextualist argument.  First, 
they suggest that the move to expand M is illicit, since rather than providing a reductive 
explanation for the behaviour of the mechanism we set out to analyze, we have shifted to 
explaining a wholly different mechanism, namely M+n.  Second, they suggest that, even 
if the expansion of M is granted, the contextualist may face a pernicious regress, where 
the mechanism must be continually expanded to account for temporally prior causal 
influence.  I claim that contextualism has the resources to resist the first consideration, 
and that the second clarifies an explanandum for contextualism rather than being an 
objection against it.  
 The problem with the debate about context and reduction is that it is still framed in 
terms of atomsim, and Delehanty’s approach does not do enough to abandon that 
framing.  According to Delehanty, we start out with a pre-existing mechanism and then 
‘add on’ the components needed to account for its behaviour in the context.  This invites 
the response from Hütteman and Love, because it starts from the standpoint that a given 
mechanism’s behaviour is what’s at stake, and that contextual influence is only an add-on 
to that mechanism.  It thus seems like something is ‘left out’ of the new explanation—
namely the original explanandum, the behaviour of M.  This is not the way the 
contextualist should go.  Instead, the contextualist should lean on the flexibility described 
in the previous sections to suggest that mechanism identity simpliciter is dependent on 
context.  Recall that the idea of a consistent mechanistic organization is an implication of 
atomism, not contexutalism.  According to the full-throated contextualist, we aren’t 
beholden to a previously specified mechanistic organization when context changes—we 
are not attempting to explain M+n but N, the mechanism that is relevant in the 
explanatory context.  Hence, there is no residual explanandum left unexplained. 
 One might worry that this is too permissive, that there must be stricter conditions on 
mechanism identity, lest we be left with a hodgepodge of single cases.11  The 
contextualist response to this is two-fold.  First, the need to index mechanism identity to 
context doesn’t mean that there is no generalizability to particular mechanistic 
descriptions (see section 4).  For instance, there seem to be consistent, discoverable 
organizations to the mechanisms underlying sensorimotor decision making, attention, 
episodic memory, and adaptation after feedback (section 5).  The point of the 
contextualist position is that these generalizations must be discovered.  We don’t know 
that a given mechanistic organization will remain constant across contexts just because 
we’ve isolated it in one context.   
 The regress worry is a real one.  But as Hütteman and Love admit (Love, personal 
communication), it is an empirical worry.  It might be the case that some systems are so 
causally integrated that there is no place one can stop the potential regress—each 
mechanistic organization might depend so far back in a causal chain for its identity that 
there is no way to genuinely set it apart from the surrounding system.  Stated as such, the 
regress objection is not an in-principle one, but a challenge to show, in a particular 
system, how mechanism identity can be established within a context, as separable from 
prior contexts.   
 There are two potential avenues of answering this challenge within the multiplexing 
framework, at least as it’s developed so far.  The first is that there may be dynamical 
properties of the system that provide ‘re-sets’ for its behaviour.  For instance, Canolty et 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Thanks to Alan Love for pressing me to consider this objection. 
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al. ([2012]) suggest that periods of low beta-power in the course of their experiments 
might serve to interrupt a given multiplexing scheme and ready the system for the next 
task.  Second, and more broadly, there are intriguing results suggesting that areas of the 
so-called ‘rich club’ network—high-degree nodes that are also intimately connected—
oscillate at an extremely slow frequency, and change their patterns of functional 
connectivity between rest and tasks.  One way to read the function of this network is as a 
higher-order system that mediates competitions between other networks, in terms of 
which will become active in the given context (Senden et al. [2018]; Burnston and 
Haueis, in submission).  Which sub-network is activated is reliable across tasks, and thus 
the rich club mediation may contribute to reliable, but context-sensitive, organization.  
The two mechanisms—re-sets and competition—both suggest natural points at which 
mechanism organization shifts.  Once we figure out how the context shift is mediated, we 
can then focus on decomposition within that context.  So, while both of these proposals 
need fleshing out, they illustrate the kind of explanation needed in order to avoid the 
regress worry. 
 
7  Conclusion 
 
I hope to have established that certain common inferences in the philosophy of science 
are mistaken, and that dialectics surrounding mechanistic and reductive explanation in 
biology and neuroscience have become muddied as a result.  The multiplexing 
framework I’ve articulated will not be applicable to all complex systems we might want 
to analyze—if complexity and decomposition are indeed compatible, we can expect that 
different systems will have very different ways of implementing decomposition.  
Hopefully, this account might serve as an exemplar for analysis of other systems, though 
the specifics will differ.  If my arguments are on track, then philosophers of science 
should be spending their time trying to articulate the organizational principles that 
implement decomposition in context-sensitive, dynamically interactive networks, rather 
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